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Factional	Federalism,	State	Capacity,	and	Fiscal
Constraints:	Pakistan’s	COVID-19	Challenges
As	Covid-19	spreads	across	Pakistan,	Hassan	Javid,	Sameen	M.	Ali,	and	Umair	Javed	(Lahore	University	of
Management	Sciences,	Pakistan)	explain	how	the	country’s	ability	to	effectively	deal	with	the	virus	will	be
impeded	by	tensions	between	the	central	and	provincial	governments,	a	lack	of	state	capacity,	and	fiscal
constraints.
On	31	March,	the	official	number	of	Covid-19	cases	in	Pakistan	had	reached	2,000,	a	number	widely	believed	to	be
understating	the	true	spread	of	the	virus	in	the	country.	Since	the	first	positive	cases	of	infection	were	detected	in
the	country,	having	apparently	been	brought	to	Pakistan	by	pilgrims	returning	from	Iran,	the	state’s	response	has
been	shaped	by	three	major	factors	that	have	inhibited	its	ability	to	effectively	deal	with	the	crisis:	tensions	between
the	federal	and	provincial	governments	generated	by	political	competition	and	confusion	over	their	areas	of
responsibility,	capacity	issues	in	terms	of	the	state’s	ability	to	deploy	an	inadequate	public	healthcare	system	and
an	inefficient	bureaucracy	to	tackle	the	virus,	and	serious	resource	constraints	impeding	the	mobilization	of	funds
and	material	to	deal	with	the	logistical	needs	of,	and	economic	fallout	from,	dealing	with	Covid-19,	have	all	led	to	a
situation	in	which	it	is	likely	that	Pakistan	will	be	hit	hard	by	the	pandemic	in	the	months	to	come.
Upon	achieving	independence	from	British	rule	in	1947,	Pakistan	inherited	a	public	healthcare	system	that	bore	the
imprint	of	colonial	priorities	and	political	imperatives.	Sustained	by	a	curious	and	often	confusing	mix	of
philanthropic	grants	and	public	funds,	large	government	hospitals	in	newly	independent	Pakistan	were	ostensibly
state-run,	employing	medical	personnel	who	were	government	employees	and	providing	healthcare	free	of	cost	to
the	population	at	large.
However,	while	hospitals	could	be	found	in	large	cities	like	Lahore	and	Karachi,	there	was	little	to	no	infrastructure
in	place	for	the	provision	of	healthcare	in	Pakistan’s	smaller	towns	and	villages.	Significantly,	the	management	and
provision	of	healthcare	was	something	that	had	been	devolved	to	the	provincial	governments	during	the	Raj;	the
exception	to	this	came	in	the	form	of	mass	campaigns	to	deal	with	recurring	epidemics	like	malaria,	smallpox	and
cholera,	which	had	often	prompted	the	colonial	government	to	initiate	top-down	programmes	to	limit	the	spread	of
these	diseases.
When	Pakistan’s	planners	and	policy-makers	first	grappled	with	the	question	of	improving	the	countries	healthcare
system	in	the	1950s	and	1960s,	attempts	to	initiate	reform	tended	to	be	stymied	not	only	be	questions	of	cost,	but
also	by	enduring	differences	between	the	federal	and	provincial	governments	over	their	respective	spheres	of
influence.	In	the	1950s,	for	example,	when	the	smallpox	and	cholera	epidemics	hit,	the	government’s	response	was
hampered	by	divisions	and	inequalities	between	the	two	units	of	the	country	–	East	and	West	Pakistan.
In	the	early	1970s,	ambitious	plans	to	overhaul	the	country’s	healthcare	system,	such	as	the	People’s	Health
Programme	envisioned	by	the	PPP	government	that	would	have	seen	a	tremendous	expansion	of	rural	health
services	through	the	establishment	of	a	devolved	and	integrated	network	of	local	clinics	and	hospitals,	with	an
emphasis	on	community	health	services,	foundered	on	disputes	over	how	the	costs	would	be	divided	by	federal	and
provincial	governments,	and	which	level	of	government	actually	bore	responsibility	for	implementing	the	proposed
plans.	This	conflict	can	only	be	understood	in	the	broader	context	of	centre-province	tensions	in	Pakistan;	the
allocation	of	resources	and	the	devolution	of	responsibilities	have	long	been	a	source	of	conflict	between	a	federal
government	seen	as	being	dominated	by	a	Punjabi	establishment	and	provincial	governments	representing	ethnic
factions	vying	for	greater	power	and	autonomy.
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In	2010,	after	the	passage	of	the	18th	Amendment	to	the	Constitution	devolved	greater	power	to	the	provinces,	the
existing	confusion	over	areas	of	responsibility	was	exacerbated	by	obvious	competition	between	federal	and
provincial	governments	controlled	by	rival	parties.	This	has	been	clearly	evident	in	Pakistan’s	response	to	Covid-19:
while	the	PTI-led	federal	government	has	dithered	over	its	approach	to	dealing	with	the	crisis,	apparently	unable	to
agree	on	the	scale	of	the	problem	and	whether	or	not	the	response	to	it	requires	drastic	measures	such	as
lockdowns	and	mass	testing,	provincial	governments	controlled	by	other	parties,	such	as	the	PPP	in	Sindh,	have
gone	ahead	and	implemented	their	own	measures	to	curtail	the	spread	of	the	virus.	The	result	of	this	has	been	a
patchwork	of	responses	to	a	crisis	that	arguably	requires	a	unified	and	coherent	collective,	national	approach;	for
example,	Sindh	and	KP’s	relatively	rapid	response	to	the	crisis,	exemplified	by	the	imposition	of	a	lockdown,
establishment	of	quarantine	centres	before	the	other	province,	and	their	effective	communication	strategy,	can	be
contrasted	with	the	approach	taken	in	Balochistan,	where	a	failure	to	effectively	screen	pilgrims	arriving	from	Iran
arguably	precipitated	the	spread	of	Covid-19	in	Pakistan,	and	Punjab,	where	a	refusal	to	ban	the	annual
congregation	of	the	Tablighi	Jamaat	has	led	to	members	of	the	religious	organization	infecting	each	other	and
spreading	the	virus	to	different	parts	of	the	country.	Matters	have	not	been	helped	by	partisan	political	attacks
aimed	at	undermining	the	work	being	done	by	different	governments	to	contain	Covid-19.
While	Pakistan	has	had	some	success	in	dealing	with	national	disasters	and	other	crisis	in	the	past,	such	as	was
the	case	with	the	2005	earthquakes	in	Balakot,	recurring	flooding	in	Sindh	from	2010-2015,	and	epidemic	of
dengue	fever	in	Punjab,	these	responses	often	took	time	to	mobilise,	with	several	weeks	elapsing	before	systems
were	put	in	place	that	could	adequately	cater	to	the	needs	of	those	most	affected	by	these	issues.	More
importantly,	the	evidence	suggests	that	these	models	of	response,	assistance,	and	recovery	benefitted	from	a
modicum	of	political	stability;	the	PPP	in	Sindh	and	PML-N	in	Punjab	were	able	to	build	responses	to	flooding	and
dengue	respectively	by	leveraging	their	control	over	provincial	administrations	they	had	presided	over	for
successive	terms.	However,	given	that	many	of	these	measures	have	generally	tended	to	rely	on	executive	fiat,
rather	than	concrete	legislative	and	institutional	reforms	that	would	protect	them	from	changes	in	personnel	and
political	priorities,	the	replacement	of	an	incumbent	party	by	a	rival	has	tended	to	be	accompanied	by	the	neglect	of
institutions	that	may	have	previously	been	put	in	place	to	deal	with	crises.	Dengue	control	in	Punjab	and	the	fight
against	polio	in	Pakistan	are	both	good,	recent	examples	of	this,	whereby	it	could	be	argued	that	the	replacement	of
key	bureaucratic	personnel	and	experts	by	the	newly	elected	PTI	government,	the	government’s	relative	lack	of
experience,	and	the	broader	lack	of	institutionalisation	of	these	programmes,	contributed	to	the	resurgence	of	both
of	these	diseases	in	Pakistan	after	2018.
As	stated	above,	the	public	healthcare	system	in	Pakistan	is	woefully	inadequate	for	dealing	with	the	needs	of	220
million	people;	in	the	context	of	Covid-19,	Pakistan	possesses	only	0.32	ICU	beds	per	100,000	people	and	1
ventilator	per	100,000	people.	With	no	ready	or	obvious	way	to	increase	the	capacity	of	its	healthcare	system,	the
only	real	alternative	is	to	focus	on	preventive	measures,	such	as	social	distancing,	mass	testing,	and	quarantining,
to	inhibit	the	spread	of	the	virus.	Here,	however,	as	has	been	repeatedly	emphasised	by	the	federal	government,
Pakistan	faces	serious	trade-offs.	In	addition	to	the	obvious	problem	of	how	Pakistan	would	be	able	to	actually
enforce	a	lockdown	and	initiate	mass-testing,	bringing	social	and	economic	life	to	a	halt	would	entail	serious	costs
for	the	poor	and	marginalised	in	Pakistan.
In	the	last	week	of	March,	provincial	governments	announced	significant	re-allocations	of	their	existing	budgets
towards	emergency	response	and	healthcare	infrastructure	upgradation.	Three	of	the	four	provinces	also	initiated
work	on	identifying	vulnerable	households	who	have	suffered	from	employment	and	income	shocks,	and	proposed
a	series	of	social	protection	measures,	which	included	direct	cash	transfers	and	a	public	works	rural	employment
scheme	for	infrastructure	projects.
Following	the	provinces’	lead,	the	federal	government	too	announced	a	Rs.	1.2	trillion	($7.2	billion)	stimulus,	of
which	roughly	2/5th	is	reserved	as	emergency	relief	and	direct	support	for	vulnerable	groups.	The	flagship
intervention	within	this	package	plans	to	enlarge	and	make	use	of	the	existing	cash-transfer	programme,	the
Benazir	Income	Support	Programme	(BISP,	recently	rebranded	to	‘Ehsaas	Kifalat’),	which	was	established	in	July
2008.	Under	this	scheme,	4.5	million	existing	beneficiary	households	would	receive	an	additional	Rs.	1000	per
month	for	the	next	four	months,	while	another	5.5	million	vulnerable	beneficiary	households	will	be	added	for	the
same	four-month	period	after	proposed	identification	through	the	National	Socio-Economic	Registry	(NSER),	the
National	Database	and	Registration	Authority	(NADRA),	and	a	self-enrolment	plus	verification	exercise	through
SMS.
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At	this	point,	it	is	unclear	whether	federal	and	provincial	governments	in	Pakistan	would	actually	be	able	to
implement	their	plans,	given	extant	capacity	and	fiscal	constraints.	For	example,	while	existing	beneficiaries	of
social	protection	schemes	such	as	BISP,	may	be	approached	with	relative	ease,	it	is	unclear	whether	there	is
capacity	to	target	households	rendered	newly	vulnerable	by	the	COVID-19	shock.	It	is	also	not	clear	if	such	a	plan
would	be	sustainable	if	a	lockdown	or	similar	measures	were	required	for	an	extended	period	of	time.	As	the
number	of	Covid-19	cases	rises	in	Pakistan	and	the	government’s	response	continues	to	founder,	it	seems	the
worst	is	yet	to	come.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Featured	image:	Mask.	Credit:	Panos	131212,	Pixabay.
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